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This paper describes trends in the growth of precious metals produc­
tion in eighteenth century New Spain, assesses the relations between 
government and industry in the Bourbon era, analyzes the role of the 
mining sector in the colonial economy, and sketches the causes of the 
collapse of the mining industry after 1810. T he principal focus of the 
paper is economic, rather than institutional. T he approach is general, 
rather than detailed. T he purpose is to present a somewhat different 
view of the Mexican mining industry in this period than that found in 
the historiography, and to indicate the research tasks that promise the 
most significant results in the future. A more general objective of the 
paper is to contribute to new currents of work on the late colonial eco­
nomy at a moment when -  as this timely volume demonstrates -  
research in this area is already transform ing the field. It will become 
clear in the course of this paper, however, that the author owes a large 
debt to scholars who have published an indispensible series of monogra­
phic studies on the colonial mining industry over the course of the past 
decade, and especially to David Brading, whose work on M iners and 
Merchants in Bourbon M exico  set a standard for the field .' T he story of 
the eighteenth -  century mining industry that emerged from  the new 
work of the past ten years did not always fundam entally alter received 
wisdom about the industry. Late colonial Mexico experienced an unpre­
cedented mining "boom”; the task was to explain how this boom was 
achieved. Government promotion played an im portant role in the boom; 
the problem was to explain the origins of official activism and to distin­
guish its effects. T he industry collapsed when the 1810 insurgents, in 
their zeal to destroy all things Spanish, laid waste to mine works and 
refineries; little research was required to document this conclusion.
For the most part, this story is false. Mexico did not experience an 
unprecedented mining boom at the end of the century, but at the 
beginning, as G arner has already shown.^ In fact, the late colonial
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mining industry was in such deep trouble that it survived by draining the 
public treasury and diverting resources from  other sectors. Government 
promotion cannot explain a boom that did not occur; it can only explain 
an increase in physical output based on propping up marginal operations 
(some quite large). The insurgents did not cause the collapse through 
destruction of plant and equipm ent (which could have been repaired). 
They merely accelerated the fiscal crisis that would have ended public 
subsidies and produced the collapse of industry in a short time anyway. 
T he mining industry was so sick by 1810 that it can be doubted whether 
the industry’s decline had anything to do with the insurgency at all.
This rather different story emerges from a study of published data, 
rather than new research. It is thus based on the work of other scholars 
whose studies departed from a much different set of assumptions and 
embodied different research strategies. T he data they report are therefore 
imperfect for testing the hypotheses sketched here. Nonetheless, they are 
sufficient to demonstrate the significance that new prim ary research in 
this area could have for understanding economic trends in the late 
colonial era. T he first section below reviews descriptive accounts of 
trends in physical output, the second questions the significance of this 
raw data for analyzing the health of the industry and recomputes output 
to reflect the purchasing power of the gold and silver produced in market 
terms, the third addresses the related questions of industry productivity 
and profit trends, the fourth reviews government efforts to prop up the 
industry, the fifth discusses the role of the mining industry in the 
economy as a whole, the sixth takes a new look at the industry’s decline 
after 1810, and the final section comments on the future of research in 
this area.
/.
Descriptive accounts of the growth of precious metals production in 
eighteenth -  century New Spain can rely on reasonably accurate da ta .3 
T able I reproduces the well -  known statistics, with the data grouped into 
five year periods. Table II presents the same data in index form, 
showing the output of each period as a percentage of the output of the 
period 1755 -  59. M easured from  the endpoints of each quinquennium , 
output increased at an annual average rate of 1.7 percent from  1695/99 
to 1805/09. This growth represents an impressive achievement, the more 
so when it is recalled that population grew in this period at only about 
0.5 percent.*
27
TABLE I: Production o f  Precious Metals, 1 6 9 5 - 1814 
(Millions o f  pesos, by quinquennia)
1695/99 19.6 1755/59 65.7
1700/04 25.3 1760/64 58.5
1705/09 28.5 1765/69 60.9
1710/14 32.8 1770/74 80.8
1715/19 35.0 1775/79 91.0
1720/04 50.3 1780/84 100.3
1725/09 52.0 1785/89 93.2
1730/04 52.5 1790/94 109.7
1735/09 47.7 1795/99 121.2
1740/04 48.6 1800/04 104.6
1745/09 59.6 1805/09 122.0
1750/04 64.6 1810/14 47.1
Source: M anuel Orozco y Berra, "Inform e sobre la acuñación en las Casas de 
M oneda de la República,” Anexo to the Memoria of the Secretaría de 
Fomento (Mexico, 1857).
TABLE II: Index o f  Physical O utput, M exican M ining, 1 6 9 5 - 1814 
(1 7 5 5 -5 9  -  100)
1695/99 29 1755/59 100
1700/04 39 1760/64 89
1705/09 43 1765/69 93
1710/14 50 1770/74 123
1715/19 53 1775/79 139
1720/24 77 1780/84 153
1725/29 79 1785/89 142
1730/34 80 1790/94 167
1735/39 73 1795/99 185
1740/44 74 1800/04 159
1745/49 91 1805/09 186
1750/54 98 1810/14 72
Source: See Table I.
R ather than steady increases, decade by decade, New Spain’s mining 
industry appears to have grown in sharp spurts, followed by prolonged 
periods of stagnation. In the first half of the 1720’s, output reached an 
annual average of more than ten million pesos. T hen, for the next two 
decades it stuck there. In  the late 1740’s, production leaped to twelve 
million a year and stuck again at the new level, this time for a quarter 
century, until a new spurt in the 1770’s. In the 70’s and 80’s, output 
stuck again between sixteen and twenty million pesos per year. In the
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final two decades of the period, annual production averaged between 
twenty -  one and twenty -  four million pesos per year. H istorians of the 
eighteenth century mining industry have thus correctly searched for dis­
crete events, local bonanzas, and policy initiatives to explain the 
achievement of each new plateau.
This pattern is also revealed in the data displayed in Table III. H ere, 
the data have been grouped into irregular periods suggested by the 
plateau pattern. T he growth rates displayed in the table represent the 
compound annual rate of increase (or decrease) for the five year average 
measured from the last year of one quinquennium  to the last year of a 
subsequent quinquennium . T he table shows that the most prolonged 
period of rapid growth in the entire century occurred in the first quarter 
when the output of precious metals advanced at an annual average rate 
of 3.2 percent. This is the only period which does not display the plateau 
pattern, although growth did slow somewhat in the late 1710’s. From 
the 1720’s to the 1740’s, production declined at just under 0.1 percent 
per year. T he spurt in the late 174-O’s reached a rate of 4.1 percent per 
year. From the 1740’s to the 1760’s growth declined to a mere 0.1 
percent per annum . T he spurt in the 1770’s lasted most of the decade; 
annual growth averaged 2.7 percent. From the late 1770’s to the late 
1780’s, growth fell to 0.2 percent per year. T he spurt in the late 1780’s
TABLE III: Growth o f  M ining Output, 1 6 9 5 -1 8 0 9  
(Average A nnual Increase in Percent)
1695/99 - 1720/24 + 3.2
1720/24 - 1740/44 0.1
1740/44 - 1745/49 ■ 4.1
1745/49 - 1765/69 + 0.1
1765/69 - 1775/79 + 2.7
1775/79 - 1785/89 + 0.2
1785/89 - 1790/94 + 3.3
1790/94 - 1805/09 + 0.1
1765/69 - 1805/09 + 1.7
1775/09 - 1805/09 + 0.7
Source: See Table I.
to early 1790’s reached a rate of 3.3 percent, while the succeeding period 
saw stagnation at 0.1 percent per year. M easured without the brief 
spurt in the 1790’s, the annual average rate of increase from  the late 
1770’s to 1805/09 was 0.7 percent. This exercise suggests that historians 
of growth should focus on the first quarter of the eighteenth century, the
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early 1740’s, and the decades of the 1770’s and the 1790’s in looking 
for the causes of New Spain’s mining ’’boom”. Most of the growth in 
physical output of precious metals occurred in these brief periods."’
Although two decades of significant growth occurred during the 
Bourbon period, it is not clear from the data w hether the historians are 
justified in referring to the period as a ’’boom”. M easured from  the 
beginning of the era in the late 1760’s to its end in the quinquennium 
1805/09, output grew at an annual average rate of 1.7 percent. This is 
certainly a respectable rate of growth, even if it was largely confined to 
two of the four decades in the period. It is more than twice the rate of 
population increase, and rapid even by the later standards of the 
industrial revolution. This conclusion stands, even if the data are ad­
justed to take into account the debasem ent of the coinage that occurred 
in small doses in 1732, 1772 and 1776.6 By the latter date, the silver 
content of the coins minted in Mexico had fallen to just over 93 percent 
of the silver content of the pre -  1732 period. Adjusted for this debase­
ment, the growth rate over the whole Bourbon period drops only slightly, 
to 1.4 percent per annum . Nonetheless, the growth of output at the 
beginning of the century over a period of equal length averaged 3.2 
percent per year, a much more impressive achievement.
II.
M easuring the growth o f the mining industry in terms of physical 
output gives only a partial and not altogether accurate picture of trends 
in the industry. M ining produced money. T he law required that all 
metals produced be dispatched to the mint to be converted into bars of 
coin. T he prices of the goods and services for which gold and silver were 
exchanged fluctuated constantly. T o assess the productivity of the 
mining industry, it is necessary to take into account these fluctuations in 
the purchasing power of the industry’s output.
To measure productivity, physical output is not always the appro­
priate measure, since it does not m easure output growth in market terms. 
Economists define productivity as the return to scarce factors of pro­
duction. W hen the commodity produced is money itself, its value must 
be expressed in terms of its capacity to comm and other resources. Only 
then can costs incurred in the marketplace to produce the output be 
measured against the market value of the product.
Unfortunately, no adequate measure o f the purchasing power of gold 
and silver coins yet exists for eighteenth -  century Mexico. T o  analyze
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the health of the industry, metals production should be deflated by an 
index of the prices of the commodities purchased by metals producers. 
Although the history of prices is still in its infancy, two long price series 
do exist that provide a crude measure of the purchasing power of the 
peso. O ne is the study by Enrique Florescano of the price of maize in 
eighteenth -  century Mexico City; the other is an index of the prices of 
seven agricultural and livestock commodities produced by Cecilia Rabell 
in her study of San Luis de la Paz, a small farm ing community near 
G uanajuato .7
TABLE IV: M arket Value o f  Precious M etals Production in M exico, 
1 6 9 5 - 1814 (M illions o f  pesos o f  1775/79)
Florescano index Rabell index
1695/99 13.1
1700/04 - 18.6
1705/09 _ 22.0
1710/14 - 32.1
1715/19 _ 39.8
1720/24 52.2 58.1
1725/29 54.1 43.2
1730/34 52.2 42.1
1735/39 45.6 47.7
1740/44 40.8 43.7
1745/49 49.5 41.2
1750/54 50.1 64.9
1754/59 65.7 65.7
1760/64 57.2 70.0
1765/69 75.2 - _
1770/74 62.5 110.7
1775/79 99.1 133.3
1780/84 78.3 _
1785/89 42.6 _
1790/94 93.6
1795/99 81.3 71.6
1800/04 67.5 51.7
1805/09 69.3 _
1810/14 18.1 -
Source: See text.
Table IV  reestimates mining output by deflating data on physical 
output using the Florescano and Rabell price indices. T he results of this 
exercise are striking. T he three decades at the beginning of the eight­
eenth century stand out even more than before for sustained and rapid 
growth, reaching an average of 6.1 percent per year when deflated by
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the Rabell index. At the same time, the Bourbon period looks much 
more anemic than before. Deflated by either index, the series reaches a 
peak in the five year period 1775/79. M easured from that point to any 
later point, the growth rate is negative. T he market value of the precious 
metals produced between 1775/9 and 1805/9 declined at an annual 
average rate of 1.0 percent.
TABLE V: Index o f  M arket Value o f  Precious M etals Production in 
M exico, 1 6 9 5 - 1814 (1755 -  59 -  100)
Florescano Rabell (Physical Output)
1695/99 . 20.0 (29)
1700/04 - 28.3 (39)
1705/09 - 33.5 (43)
1710/14 - 48.9 (50)
1715/19 - 60.6 (53)
1720/24 79.5 88.4 (77)
1725/29 82.3 65.8 (79)
1730/34 79.4 64.1 (80)
1735/39 69.4 72.6 (73)
1740/44 62.1 65.5 (74)
1745/49 75.3 62.7 (91)
1750/54 76.3 98.8 (98)
1755/59 100.0 100.0 (100)
1760/64 87.1 106.5 (89)
1765/69 114.5 _ (93)
1770/74 95.1 168.5 (123)
1775/79 150.8 202.9 (139)
1780/84 119.2 - (153)
1785/89 64.8 - (142)
1790/94 142.5 - (167)
1795/99 123.7 109.0 (185)
1800/04 102.7 78.7 (159)
1805/09 105.5 - (186)
1810/14 27.5 - (72)
Source: See Tables II and IV.
T he plateau pattern observed in the physical output data can also be 
observed in the purchasing power of value series, and the timing is 
roughly the same. T he value series reaches its first plateau in the first 
half of the 1720’s, spurts again in the early 1750’s (later than physical 
output), and reaches a new plateau in the 1770’s. Only the low level of 
prices at the beginning of the century and the marked inflation at the 
end of the period produce noteworthy alternations in the trends, sharp­
ening the expansion at the beginning and converting modest growth into 
depression at the end of the century. T able V  displays the data in index
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form , while Table V I recomputes industry growth rates.
Caution should be exercised in interpreting the market value series. 
T he new figures represent the total value of mining production solely in 
terms of domestically produced agricultural commodities. In the absence 
of other price indices for eighteenth -  century Mexico, however, the 
series can help to correct impressionistic accounts that have relied on 
measures of physical output alone. M oreover, the significance of agri­
cultural prices for mining operations have never been doubted. As 
Brading observed, ’’any increase in the price of maize and hay could 
easily drive a m iner close to bankruptcy.”® For more precise analytical 
uses, however, the data are still far from satisfactory.
TABLE V I: Growth R ate o f  M arket Value, Precious Metals, 
1695 -  1809 (Annual Average Percentage Change)
Florescano index Rabell index
1695/99 - 1720/24 + 6.1
1720/24 - 1740/44 -  0.1 -  1.1
1740/44 - 1765/69 + 2.1 -
1765/69 - 1775/79 + 2.8 _
1775/79 - 1785/89 -  8.8 -
1785/89 - 1 790/94 + 8.2 _
1790/94 - 1805/09 -  1.5 -
1775/79 - 1805/09 -  0.1 -
1765/69 - 1805/09 + 0.2 -
Source: See text.
III.
Systematic data on factor and input costs facing the eighteenth- 
century mining industry have yet to be collected. It is therefore impos­
sible to make precise estimates of trends in productivity. T here are no 
reliable data with which to compare the market value series. An indirect 
and partial m easure may be suggestive, nonetheless. If costs rose in 
proportion to the level of prices, then the ratio of market value to phys­
ical output can serve as an indicator of the productivity of the industry. 
(In this case, the ratio of market value to physical output would equal 
the ratio of total costs to physical output.) Alternatively, this ratio can be 
used as a rough index of changing profit levels. (In this case, profits 
would be assumed to depend on the ’’basket” o f commodities that a given
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level of output could command in the m arket.) Com bining the two 
interpretations would make the series into a rough measure of the health 
of the industry. T he data are presented in T able V II. T he table shows 
the num ber of pesos of constant purchasing power of 1755/59 that mine 
owners earned for each 100 pesos of coin produced.
TABLE V II: Ratio o f  M arket Value to Physical O utput, Precious 
Metals, 169 5 -1 8 1 4
Florescano index Rabell index
1695/99 57
1700/04 - 63
1705/09 - 66
1710/14 - 84
1715/19 - 97
1720/24 120 99
1725/29 120 71
1730/34 106 69
1735/39 110 79
1740/44 97 77
1745/49 96 59
1750/54 91 86
1755/59 115 86
1760/64 113 102
1765/69 143 -
1770/74 89 117
1775/79 126 126
1780/84 90 -
1785/89 53 -
1790/94 98 -
1795/99 77 51
1800/04 75 -
1805/09 66 -
1810/14 44 -
Source: See text.
T he ratio series correlates roughly with the output and value series. 
T he ratio increases by nearly 50 percent between 1695/99 and 1720/4, as 
the industry boomed. T he period of highest index values occurs in the 
third quarter of the century, between 1750/4 and 1775/9. T he decline 
after this point to the end of the century is quite marked.
O f course, this index measures productivity only if the unit cost of 
producing a mark of silver moved in concert with the price indices 
employed to construct it. If  unit costs were rising more rapidly than 
prices, the ratio will overestimate productivity. If unit costs rose more
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slowly, productivity will be underestimated by ratio. T he question yet to 
be answered is whether the real cost of producing a unit of constant 
market value was rising or falling.
The evidence is mixed on this point, but it appears easier to interpret 
toward the end of the eighteenth century than at any point earlier. The 
hypothesis that best explains the evidence is that the industry faced rising 
marginal costs for at least the period 1780 to 1810. T hat is, the cost of 
producing a fixed quantity of metallic purchasing power was rising. The 
industry was in trouble.
T he evidence on this point can be summarized briefly under three 
headings. First, there is abundant evidence that quality of the ores mined 
was declining. An increasing proportion of the output of M exico’s mines 
consisted of low grade ore for which the patio  or am algam ation process 
(as opposed to cheaper and faster smelting) had to be employed to 
extract the metal. Brading presents very clear evidence of this. In  Zaca­
tecas, the proportion of low grade ore processed by am algam ation 
increased from  66 to 85 percent between 1763 and 1806. In G uanajuato, 
the entire increase in production between the 1760’s and 1804 was due 
to am algamation. T he output of smelted ore actually decreased in this 
period.9
Second, the size and depth of mine shafts and their attendant 
drainage works was increasing. As shafts were driven deeper, drainage 
problems increased. T he revival of Zacatecas (and its later decline), as 
well as the fortunes of all the other m ajor mining centers, came to 
depend critically on reaching ever lower depths. Such excavations and 
drainage operations made it more costly both to reach the ore and to 
extract i t .10
T hird , labor costs appear to have been rising along with the cost of 
other inputs miners had to acquire in the market, mules, tim ber, tools, 
and the like. T he evidence on labor costs is mixed, since efforts were 
made, quite logically, to reduce costs either by forcing down wages, 
eliminating or reducing the partido  or resorting to government aid 
(exemption of the labor force from  the tribute, forced labor drafts, and 
the like).11
The evidence on industry profits has not been systematically collected 
and analyzed. Two main sources of profit support have been identified 
in the literature. T he first consisted of organizational and, though less 
likely, technological changes that could have offset rising factor and 
output costs. T he second, discussed below, was government support for 
the industry.
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O ne way to approach the issue of profit is to revise the market value 
series to reflect more closely the ’’basket” of commodities on which profit 
earners may have been spending their gains. T he series in T able IV 
above provides a m easure of the purchasing power of mining output in 
the market for maize (Florescano) or maize plus six other products 
(Rabell). T he owners of New Spain’s principal mines, however, built 
their reputations for opulence in conspicuous consumpton and for 
marshalling investment capital through their command over a fa r  wider 
variety of products and services.
For both consumption and investment, it is safe enough to assume 
that these were highly labor intensive. T hus, actual profit depended on 
labor market conditions and social organization (in which conditions 
appear to have favored employers, at least from  the 1750’s to the 
1810’s).1  ^ Q ualitative evidence also suggests that consumption, and 
possibly some investment activity, depended to an unm easured degree on 
imports from abroad .15 While there are no measures of elite propensi­
ties to consume imports, descriptive accounts suggest that they were high, 
especially in clothing, wine, consumer durables like pianos and furni­
ture, and (possibly for investment) iron and steel products.
Price trends for commodities imported to New Spain have not yet 
been studied systematically. T he data rem ain scattered through an 
immense ramo of the Archivo General de la Nación. Nonetheless, two 
observations can be made from the quantitative evidence available at 
present. First, as Brading has observed, the Bourbon liberalization of 
intra -  imperial trade appears to have reduced the prices of imported 
products to consumers in the colony, in part through reducing the 
inconvenience and cost of shipping between New Spain and the rest of 
the empire and in part through abolishing (in 1778) the monopoly on 
foreign trading once held tightly by the Consulado de M éxico.1“1 
Secondly, however, international trade prices in the late eighteenth 
century are known to have been rising, especially in periods of war
(1 7 5 6 -6 3 ; 1 7 7 8 -8 3 ; 17 9 6 - 1802; 18 0 3 - 1812). For New Spain, the 
positive effects of liberalization were probably felt most strongly in the 
1770’s and 1780’s (but offset in the 80’s by the great fam ine of 
1 7 8 4 -8 5 ) , while the negative impact of international w arfare was 
strongest later in the period. T he Bourbon reforms may have produced a 
series of once -  and -  for -  all decreases in the level of prices consumers 
would otherwise have paid for imports, while the sharply rising trend in 
international prices after 1796 clearly offset these earlier gains by the 
turn of the century.15
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T hus, for mine owners and other consumers (and investors) of 
imported products the qualitative literature indicates that long -  run 
international price trends were consistent whith those observed for 
domestic prices. In both cases, any gains made earlier in the century had 
disappeared by the w ar years that preceded the Hidalgo revolt. In terms 
of its purchasing power, the international market value of M exico’s 
silver output was probably declining at least as rapidly as it was on 
domestic markets.
However it is measured, the mining industry of New Spain entered 
into a crisis during the era of the Bourbon reforms, an economic crisis in 
which the declining market value of precious metals combined with 
rising costs of production. Each mark of silver produced bought less and 
cost more to produce.
IV .
G overnment policy towards the mining industry not only recognized 
this crisis, but in part created it. As Brading has clearly shown, govern­
ment policy was directed towards maximizing output on the assumption 
that the output of the mining industry determined the level at which the 
colony could be taxed .16 This assumption was based on experience. 
T here was a close correlation in the eighteenth century between govern­
ment revenue and mining output. This relationship is shown in Table 
V III, where the production of precious metals is expressed as a per­
centage of government revenues. As the table indicates, this ratio was 
fairly stable throughout the first three quarters of the eighteenth century, 
varying around a mean of 225. T he only exceptional period was the 
decade of the 1720’s when mining output reached very high levels and 
the ratio leaped to more than 300. In the 1780’s, the ratio declined to its 
lowest level in the century and dropped steadily thereafter. By 1805/09, 
the ratio reached 42, that is, m ining output accounted for less than half 
of government revenue. T he Bourbon reform s culminated in w hat even 
the Spanish rulers themselves must have recognized as a drastic decapi­
talization, or at least demonetization of the colony.
In any case, until this final period of desperate expediencies, the 
Crown found that the am ount of gold and silver it could extract from  the 
colony depended on the level of production of the two metals. W hen the 
Seven Years W ar pushed the Crown to ’’reform s” that could increase 
colonial revenues, it mixed new exactions and more effective adminis­
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tration with measures to promote mining production. These measures 
included a series of steps to stimulate the revival and rehabilitation of 
marginal producers in the industry. W ith tax breaks, government aid in 
recruiting labor and generous credit to undertake the necessary excava­
tion and construction, entrepreneurs found they could make a profit of 
mines long abandoned. For the existing mines, the government was 
somewhat less generous but equally concerned. T he entire industry 
benefitted when the prices of estanco mercury and blasting powder were
TABLE V III: Precious M etals Production as a Percentage o f  
G overnm ent Revenue in M exico, 1695 -  1809
1695/99 169 1755/59 211
1700/04 184 1760/64 259
1705/09 204 1765/69 173
1710/14 186 1770/74 199
1715/19 185 1775/79 203
1720/24 380 1780/84 153
1725/29 333 1785/89 129
1730/34 226 1790/94 135
1735/39 251 1795/99 70
1740/44 192 1800/04 44
1745/49 246 1805/09 42
1750/54 229
Source: See Table I and John  TePaske, La Real Hacienda de Nueva Espãna:
La Real Caja de M éxico (1 5 76-1816)  (Mexico: IN A H , Colección 
Científica N o.41, 1976).
reduced, when the crown created the Real T ribunal de M inería to 
service the industry, and when a range of services and protections 
(including special mining courts, a new mining code and technical 
assistance missions) were provided.1  ^ T he result of these measures was 
to make production profitable despite higher costs. Physical output 
reached very high levels.
It is also possible that government aid to the industry made possible 
technological advances that would otherwise have been impossible to 
achieve. T he extent and effect of technological advance has never been 
measured, however, and Brading was probably right in according it no 
more than a minor role, certainly too small to have arrested the rise in 
marginal costs.1®
In short, the mining industry was already in decline by the time the 
independence movement erupted in 1810. T hat it did not collapse earlier
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was due in large part to direct and indirect subsidies from government. 
T he government taxed to stimulate more mining production to tax still 
more. W hen the combined forces of Napoleon Bonaparte and Padre 
Hidalgo destabilized the state, they doomed the mining industry at the 
same time.
V.
T he role of the mining industry in the economy of New Spain has 
often inspired discussion. Two broad and somewhat contradictory notions 
may be found in the literature. O ne of these holds that the mining 
industry was overdeveloped to serve the interests of the M other Country. 
Overdevelopment of mining distorted the colonial economy in both 
traditional and dependency school analysis.19 T he second broad in ter­
pretation suggests that the mining industry acted as a kind of ’’leading 
sector”, prom oting the growth of agriculture, commerce, and industry 
through backward linkages, dynamizing the economy of New Spain much 
in the m anner of a modern export s ta p le ."  It may be noted in passing 
that these two views are not necessarily opposed to each other. They may 
be reconciled in various ways. For example, more sophisticated versions 
of the dependency argum ent no longer challenge the dynamic linkages 
created by export booms. T he argum ent now turns on the long term  as 
opposed to s h o r t- te rm  benefits of such episodes.“11 Alternatively, it has 
been suggested that social, cultural or institutional constraints may 
dam pen or thw art altogether the dynamism of the export sector.11 
Distortion occurs in this model as mining profits "sink” into a backward 
agricultural sector or are dissipated in conspicuous consumption.
T he present state of research does not make it possible to reach firm 
conclusions, but the data do suggest a somewhat more complex picture 
than is usually drawn. T he relations between agriculture and m ining can 
serve to illustrate this point. Regional accounts of agricultural develop­
ment in the first quarter of the eighteenth century provide evidence of 
trends in agricultural development that appear to have coincided roughly 
with the growth of mining. Areas close to mining centers, like the Bajío 
and portions of M ichoacán and Jalisco, benefitted from  the rapid 
increase in mining production in this period.'13 It is precisely in the 
1700’s to 1720’s that many abandoned or rundown estates were 
purchased by new owners and refurbished. This trend appears to have 
continued during the 1730’s and 1740’s, but there is some evidence that 
agricultural investments were less successful in this period.1,1 After
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mid -  century, a second trend emerged, that is, the movement of the 
livestock frontier towards the far north and the conversion of cattle and 
sheep haciendas in the central regions to the production of grain and 
pulque. The timing of this shift varied, but appears to have taken hold 
in the Bajío by the 1760’s and in the G uadalajara region by the 
1770’s .25 Population growth played a role in this shift. In part, however, 
it may be attributed to the growth of the mining industry, but the data 
are too fragm entary to perm it a conclusive test.
O ne clue to the relationship between mining and agriculture may be 
found in the market value data in T able V I. This series may also be 
read as a rough index of the commodity terms of trade between mining 
and agriculture. For most of the century, terms of trade moved in favor 
of mining and against agriculture. T he high point was reached in the 
1770’s. While mining growth may have stimulated production, this 
linkage cannot explain the downward trend in the terms of trade. The 
falling relative prices for agricultural commodities could be explained by 
increasing productivity. W hile conclusions must necessarily be tentative, 
it appears that the stimulus to increased agricultural output, particularly 
to the production of food and beverage crops, promoted increased 
productivity through greater regional specialization in production, at least 
through the 1770’s.
It is possible that the growth of mining production inspired produc­
tivity gains in other sectors as well. Scattered evidence suggests that 
commerce, or the transactions sector as economists call it, becam e more 
efficient in part because markets expanded. C apital markets certainly 
became more fluid and better organized. T he development of the mining 
regions attracted labor, especially to the Bajío, so the economy gained 
from the greater mobility of labor. Productivity gains in industrial acti­
vity -  textiles, tanning and leather goods, soap and other ’’chemicals” -  
appear less likely, although processing industries like milling and sugar 
refining may be exceptions. In any case, the causes and the timing of 
these gains have yet to be investigated.26 It is noteworthy that not a 
single study has yet been completed that addresses the question of 
productivity in this period. The single exception rem ains the necessarily 
partial analysis by W ard Barret in his monograph on the sugar haciendas 
of the Cortes fam ily.27 No one has challenged his conclusion that output 
per unit of labor on these sugar estates tripled between the late sixteenth 
and the mid -  eighteenth centuries.
T he data do make clear that the role of the mining industry had 
changed significantly by the 1780’s. By this time, the dynamism of the
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industry had disappeared. By the end of the eighteenth century, the 
mining sector had become a drag on the economy. It is an open question 
w hether marginal product was declining faster in agriculture than in 
mining, but the shift of the terms of trade toward agriculture is sugges­
tive. In Mexico, as in the rest of the world, precious metals were 
becoming less scarce and agricultural products more scarce in relation to 
demand. Resources that would otherwise have shifted from m ining to 
agriculture responded to public policies designed to m aintain the attrac­
tiveness of mining for investors. Wages in both sectors failed to keep up 
with inflation, not only because unemployment was higher as a result of 
the misallocation of capital to mining and away from agriculture.
While precious metals poured from the world’s mines in immense 
quantities by the end of the eighteenth century, this commodity was 
always scarce from the point of view of the Spanish treasury. H ence the 
obsession with policies that could not have been better designed to 
weaken the Mexican economy, increase the world supply of silver, and 
thus increase still more the treasury’s appetite for this effectively 
devalued commodity. M ore measures to stimulate mining production and 
tax revenues followed, with still greater distorting effects of the alloca­
tion of capital and labor in the Mexican economy.
It would be a mistake, however, to exaggerate the significance of this 
vicious circle for New Spain’s economy as a whole. At the end of the 
eighteenth century, the m ining industry accounted for no more than 
about 8 percent of the colony’s gross domestic product of some 240 
million p e s o s . E v e n  if the entire increase in mining output after the 
1760’s could be attributed to the distortion of investment induced by 
government subsidies, it is not clear that the capital involved, even if it 
equalled as much as an entire year’s output of some 20 million pesos, 
could have reversed the decline in agricultural productivity or much 
improved the perform ance of other sectors of the economy. In any case, 
the data do not yet exist to make feasible a test of this counterfactual 
proposition. It is possible only to conclude that the mining industry con­
tributed to the general economic crisis that occurred at the end of the 
colonial period, and that this contribution was actively promoted by 
government policy.
VI.
T he collapse of the mining industry after 1810 occurred not because 
of the violence and predations of the independence movement, but
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because the government, already under seige after Napoleon’s invasion 
of the peninsula in 1808, was unable to continue supporting the industry. 
Between 1800 and 1809, M exico’s mines produced an annual average of 
22.2 million pesos. Between 1810 and 1819, output dropped to an 
annual average of only 11.3 million, a decline of nearly 50 percent. A 
portion of this decline was due to the violence and destruction wrought 
by the Hidalgo movement and by the effort to suppress it, but only part. 
T he records of the T ribunal de M inería are full of accounts by mine 
owners of the conflict and its effect on output. M any petitioned to be 
exempted from the provisions of the mining code that specified revoca­
tion of the mine ow ner’s right to exploit a mineral deposit after four
90months without working it. Most of the petitions were granted. By 
1812, however, the mine ow ner’s complaints had changed. From  this 
point until Iturbide’s coup, their letters and petitions, and the meetings 
of the mining deputies, are filled with other problems. H igh on the list 
of problems was the scarcity of mercury. In 1811, the Cortes had 
decreed an end to the estanco and declared mercury open for comercio 
libre. T he  mineowners were appalled. Private suppliers ran the price up 
from the monopoly’s subsidized price of 41 pesos to as high as 200. 
Even then, supplies were often impossible to obtain.30 In 1812, the 
Tribunal proposed to raise the funds necessary to outfit a naval expedi­
tion whose sole object would be to seize the mercury stored at Seville 
and Almadén in occupied Spain.3  ^ T he project was set aside when 
Ferdinand recovered the throne, but mercury remained scarce and the 
price high even after restoration of the monopoly.
Most of the tax exemptions, official credit, and other privileges of 
the mining industry also came to end after 1810. M iners complained 
repeatedly about the tax surcharges imposed by royalist commanders 
throughout the decade.3  ^ The T ribunal defaulted on its loans after 
making extraordinary contributions to the war effort. Official credit to 
miners for the purchase of mercury ended. Private capital dried up. 
T o make matters worse, transport charges rose precipitously with 
brigandage and labor became scarce.3^ In short, Hidalgo and Napoleon, 
even though defeated militarily, made it impossible for the government 
to provide either the subsidies or the security the industry needed to 
restore production to its form er levels. M ining collapsed when govern­
ment disintegrated.
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VII.
M uch more research on the mining industry in pre -  modern Mexico 
will be needed before the revisionist account presented here can be 
accepted, modified or cast aside. M y purpose has been to show that the 
literary and quantitative data now available provide little support for the 
traditional view of boom and prosperity, benign government, and 
collapse by destruction. Instead, the evidence points to a sick industry, 
propped up by distorted public incentives, that collapsed of its own 
weight when the colonial government could no longer intervene to 
prevent it. Testing these opposing images systematically will no doubt 
help to produce a picture with more subtle shadings, but this is scarcely 
the point. Future research can now rely on a large num ber of recent 
monographs that have effectively illuminated the institutional history of 
the mining industry. Because of this, scholars are now in a better posi­
tion to analyze the economic aspects of the silver legend directly.
Such an effort will require far more attention to the systematic col­
lection of quantitative data that bear directly on the economic issues. The 
history of prices is crucial, as are more microeconomic (firm  — level) 
data that can be manipulated to estimate the critical indicators of indus­
trial health -  costs, productivity, profit rates, the impact of subsidies -  
over time. T he data do not have to be exhaustive, merely useful for 
analytical purposes.
At the aggregate level, progress in interpreting the articulation of the 
mining industry with the rest of the economy will remain dependent, to 
an extent, on the development of economic historical work on other 
sectors of New Spain’s economy and on the international economy in the 
eighteenth century. Price history will be critical here, too, as will studies 
that address sectoral (or even micro -  level) rates of output and 
productivity change, returns to capital and land, and the like. Much 
more is known already, however, than historians have put to use for 
analytical purposes. Long run price trends for agricultural commodities 
in diverse regions of Mexico have proved to be highly correlated with 
each other, and with international price movements, for example. 
Regional studies of agricultural development, though often lacking in 
economic analysis, have produced im portant and convergent findings on 
crop mix changes and investment patterns across wide areas of the 
colony. New studies of trade and public finance have added immense 
stores of data to be assimilated.35
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In short, the economic history of the colonial mining industry in the 
eighteenth century can now be approached from a fresh perspective and 
with the support of a monographic literature that already provides the 
foundation for new discoveries. Some of them will be bonanzas.
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